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Understanding Policy Change for Obesity Prevention: Learning from Sugar-
Sweetened Beverages Taxes in Mexico and Chile
Abstract 
This article examines the policy change process that resulted in the current sugar-sweetened 
beverages (SSB) taxes in Mexico and Chile, using the Kaleidoscope Model for Policy Change, a 
framework developed for nutrition and food policy change analysis. We used a qualitative study 
design, including 24 key informant interviews (16 researchers, 5 civil society representatives, 
and 3 food/beverage industry representatives), encompassing global and in-country perspectives. 
The analysis shows concurrence with the Kaleidoscope Model, highlighting commonalities in the 
policy change process. These included the importance of focusing events and coalitions for 
agenda-setting. Both top-down executive leadership and bottom-up pressure from civil society 
coalitions were important for the policy adoption as were flexible framing of the tax, and taking 
advantage of windows of opportunity. In both countries, the tax resulted from national, revenue-
seeking fiscal reforms, and in sub-optimal tax rates, as a result of the industry influence. Key 
informants also discussed emerging evaluation results, highlighting differences in interpretation 
concerning the magnitude of change from the tax, and shared potential modifications to the 
current policies. This analysis contributes to a greater understanding of the policy change process 
focused on obesity prevention, using an innovative theoretical framework developed specifically 
for food and nutrition policy. 
Keywords: Obesity prevention, Tax, Sugar-sweetened beverages, Policy process, Mexico, Chile, 
Qualitative research
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Policymakers and health advocates recognize the need to regulate food environments to 
positively influence eating behaviors in response to the rapid global rise in diet-related chronic 
diseases. A rising number of countries and jurisdictions have adopted policies regulating the 
consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) through taxes (Leonhardt 2018). Nutrition 
policymaking in general, and SSB tax policy in particular,  are highly contentious (Baker, 
Hawkes et al. 2018, Sassi, Belloni et al. 2018). Food evokes emotional, behavioral, and 
physiological responses among consumers, making policies aimed at restricting access to certain 
foods particularly contentious – as in the case of regulating sugary beverages. These policies 
inevitably trigger debates about the proper role of government in regulating harmful behavior 
(Sassi, Belloni et al. 2018), the role of the food and beverage industry, and conflict of interest in 
the food and nutrition policymaking process (Timotijevic, Barnett et al. 2011, Nestle 2013, 
Cuadrado, Valenzuela et al. 2018). 
The complex and contentious nature of regulatory and fiscal food and nutrition policies 
necessitates a better understanding of the policymaking process. Yet, research is limited in 
relation to obesity prevention policy change processes. Most studies have taken place in the 
United States and the United Kingdom, focusing on the agenda-setting stage of the policy 
process (Clarke, Swinburn et al. 2016).  Hence, the present study sought to address the existing 
research sparsity. We used SSB taxes in two Latin American countries (Mexico and Chile) as 
objects of comparative study to examine what explains successful SSB tax reform, using the 
Kaleidoscope Model for Policy Change framework developed specifically for food and nutrition 
policies.  
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Mexico and Chile were selected as they were as early adopters of SSB tax policy for public 
health purposes, at the national level, in Latin America. Mexico and Chile have similar political 
systems, as electoral democracies that have presidential systems with bicameral legislators. They 
also have similar economic systems, as market-oriented economies (CIA 2019, CIA 2019). Both 
have employed fiscal policies to address public health concerns over obesity and non-
communicable chronic diseases. Chile has been taxing nonalcoholic drinks as a luxury good 
since the 1930s to address the country’s fiscal deficit (Ferrando 2014). The tax was applied to all 
soft drinks with added color, flavor or sweeteners, regardless of the amount of sugar. In October 
2014, the tax was modified into a two-tiered tax, based on sugar content. It was increased from 
13% to 18% on drinks containing more than 6.25g of sugar/100 ml, and decreased to 10% for 
sugary drinks with less than 6.25g of sugar/100mL. Mexico implemented a new SSB tax in 2014, 
consisting of a 1-peso-per-liter excise tax on any non-alcoholic beverage with added sugar 
(approximately a 10% price increase), with the exception of dairy products. The rate was 
adjusted for inflation in 2018, increasing to 1.17 peso-per-liter (Colchero, Barrientos Gutiérrez et 
al. 2018). The SSB tax was accompanied by an 8% tax to foods with high caloric density (>275 
calories/100g), and an earlier tax on energy drinks of 25% implemented in 2011. The two cases 
have been examined individually, using mostly quantitative, impact evaluation studies 
(Colchero, Popkin et al. 2016, Sanchez-Romero, Penko et al. 2016, Caro, Corvalan et al. 2018, 
Nakamura, Mirelman et al. 2018), with a notable exception (James, Lajous et al. 2019). This 
qualitative examination provides a new, comparative approach. 
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The study was conducted between March and August 2018, using key informant (KI) interviews 
(n=24), and a comparative, retrospective approach (Charmaz 2006) to examine the policy change 
process resulting in the current SSB taxes in Mexico and Chile. We focused on non-government 
stakeholder perspectives, including global experts. Specifically, we interviewed 16 researchers (5 
from Mexico, 5 from Chile, and 6 Global), three food and beverage industry representatives (1 
from Mexico, 2 Global), and five civil society representatives (3 from Mexico, 2 from Chile). 
Respondents were purposively sampled based on their participation in the policymaking process 
and expertise on the field. We developed separate semi-structured interview guides for the 
different respondent types (researcher, civil society, and industry), based on relevant literature 
and feedback from Chilean and Mexican researchers. Questions asked about the respondents’ 
and/or their organization’s role in SSB tax reforms; their collaboration with other organizations 
and the government; their opinion on the state of the evidence regarding sugar consumption, 
taxes and health outcomes; and their opinions on the future of SSB tax policy.  
The study was deemed as exempt by the [blind] Institutional Review Board.  Interviews were 
conducted over phone or videoconference, in Spanish or English based on the preference of the 
respondent, ranging from 30 minutes to an hour. Interviewers completed a debriefing form at the 
end of each interview to record emerging findings, which were used to assess the data saturation 
point when interviews failed to elicit new information concerning the policy change process 
(Charmaz 2006). All interviews were audio-recorded with oral consent. The interviews were 
transcribed verbatim, translated, and checked for accuracy. 
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Data Analysis and Framework
The research team reviewed the interviewers’ debriefing forms on an ongoing basis, discussing 
emerging themes, used to develop an initial list of codes. Upon reaching the saturation point, the 
team used Dedoose (v. 8.2.14) to refine and test the coding scheme, through multiple rounds of 
discussions. Once the team reached inter-rater reliability of 80%, each transcript was analyzed by 
two independent coders. We then extracted key themes and quotes, organized using the 
Kaleidoscope Model for Policy Change as a framework. The Kaleidoscope Model is a relatively 
new framework developed by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) that 
synthesizes theories and constructs from the fields of political economy, public administration, 
and policy processes, to explain policy change in food and nutrition policy (Resnick, Babu et al. 
2015, Hendricks, Babu et al. 2017), going beyond political science approaches (as the case of the 
more widely used model, the Multiple Streams Theory), to include a wider range of scholarships, 
appropriate to engage the complexity in obesity prevention policy. The model focuses on five 
key elements in the policy cycle: agenda-setting, design, adoption, implementation, and 
evaluation and reform, identifying key variables that explain policy change (further detailed in 
Table 1). The model has been tested in mostly developing country settings, examining 
agriculture and micronutrient supplementation policies (Resnick, Babu et al. 2015, Hendriks, 
Mkwandawire et al. 2016, Hendricks, Babu et al. 2017, Resnick, Haggblade et al. 2018). The 
model was selected due to its explicit focus on food policy, capturing the multisectoral 
complexity affecting nutrition policymaking, where the policies often benefit poor, 
disenfranchised sectors in the country, with benefits often perceivable in the medium and long 
term (Resnick, Babu et al. 2015).
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The interview data were complemented with relevant literature and reports concerning the SSB 
taxes in both countries. As a final step in the process, we invited Mexican and Chilean experts to 
validate and contribute to the interpretation of the findings. 
Findings 
The Mexican and Chilean SSB tax policy processes were similar and largely in concordance with 
the Kaleidoscope Model (Table 1), except for the evaluation and reform stage. Next, we examine 
the processes in parallel, organized according to policy change stages. 
[insert- Table 1. Chile and Mexico SSB tax policy change overview organized through the 
Kaleidoscope Model Stages and Determinants]
Agenda-Setting
The Kaleidoscope Model underscores three main variables affecting the agenda-setting stage: the 
existence of a “focusing event” (events that create windows of opportunity), the influence of an 
advocacy coalition, and whether the problem is perceived as relevant. These are found in the 
Mexican and Chilean SSB tax policy processes. In both countries, propitious windows of 
opportunity, brought on by newly elected governments, gave way to SSB taxes as part of large, 
fiscal reforms. In Mexico, 2012 elected Peña Nieto administration implemented a major fiscal 
reform, the “Pact for Mexico”, to generate needed revenue in light of declining oil prices (James, 
Lajous et al. 2019). In Chile, the policy change was part of the largest fiscal reform in thirty 
years, which aimed to generate revenue for comprehensive educational reform (Cuadrado, 
Valenzuela et al. 2018), proposed by the Treasury and the Ministry of Finance. As such, these 
taxes had powerful advocates from the start. 
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Researchers in Mexico and Chile heightened the problem relevance by documenting the rise of 
obesity and chronic diseases, for several years prior to reform, recording the rise in obesity, diet-
related conditions, and SSB consumption. This is important, as nutrition issues, such as 
malnutrition and increasingly issues of over-nutrition, tend to affect marginalized segments of 
society (Pena and Bacallao 2000). These problems may remain invisible or ignored. Efforts were 
aided by civil society organizations, who served as intermediaries between researchers and 
policymakers, working as “knowledge brokers” for evidence backing SSB taxes and raising the 
problem relevance in the public sphere.  These organizations made strategic use of the media to 
control the debate over the taxes and to counter opponents’ arguments. Examples of these 
campaigns included a “Twitterazo” (tweeter storm) organized by Frente por un Chile Saludable 
resulting in 6,900 tweets and 13 million impressions advocating for the tax reform (NCDAlliance 
2015). In Mexico, El Poder del Consumidor organized public demonstrations, such one during 
the Day of the Dead dedicated to Mexicans who had died from Diabetes in front of the Ministry 
of Health (Donaldson nd).
Civil society organizations used the focusing event to argue for a 20% tax rate increase, as 
recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO 2016). These coalitions were composed 
of similar players in both cases: civil society organizations (e.g., El Poder del Consumidor in 
Mexico and Frente por un Chile Saludable), public health researchers, and government officials 
and global health institutions (e.g., World Health Organization/PAHO). El Poder del 
Consumidor pre-dated the SSB tax efforts, while Frente por un Chile Saludable was created 
during the tax reform, from existing networks with previous advocacy experience.  
Local advocacy coalitions interacted with US-based researchers who were well-known experts in 
the field and junior researchers, who contributed to the evidence-building and evaluation efforts. 
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In Mexico, the advocacy coalition building was facilitated through funding from the Bloomberg 
Philanthropies, supporting the collaboration between researchers, civil society, and lobbyists. 
While advocates shared the goal of addressing obesity, this international actor motivated the 
interactions between key players in the coalition, by liaising initial connections, and funding 
liaison positions, including a public-interest lobbying firm key in persuading legislators. 
Bloomberg Philanthropies were not mentioned as a funder in regards to the SSB tax in Chile. 
When discussing the policy arena in Chile, respondents noted the networks are relatively small, 
as researchers and policymakers were already connected. 
Policy Design
In Mexico, the tax is approximately 10%, while in Chile, the policy change resulted in a two-
tiered tax, where the rate for SSBs with high sugar content (>6.25 grams per 100 ml) increased 
by only 5 percentage points (from 13% to 18%) while the tax for SSBs with lower sugar content 
(<6.25 grams per 100 ml ) was decreased to 10%. Although the 18% rate in Chile is close to the 
WHO recommended 20% rate, advocates in Chile had wanted a 20 point increase, or a 33% tax 
rate, as they believed that this increase was necessary for the population to change consumption 
(Chilikova 2016). The resulting SSB tax policy design can be explained by the Kaleidoscope 
Model, as influenced by three main variables: the type of problem (pressing vs. chosen), 
ideational considerations, and a cost-benefit analysis. 
The type of problem influences policy design as it dictates the time policymakers can take to 
address it. SSB taxes are designed and implemented to address the problem of high SSB 
consumption, and related health consequences. This is a chosen problem, as opposed to crises or 
pressing problems (i.e. natural disasters, famines). Chosen problems are not urgent. 
Policymakers can take more time to design solutions, compared to crises. There is a greater 
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opportunity for outsider input and influence, opening the door for consultations with researchers, 
civil society and other stakeholders, such as the food and beverage industry, a powerful player in 
the policy arena in Latin America. 
[The] industry continues to be part of circles of power and decision-making, which 
sometimes limits power [of the government], not only designing and promoting public 
policy that affects their interests but also monitoring and the evaluation of it. (Civil 
Society/Mexico)
Industry pressure is very strong and has been enduring, even though Chile has adhered to 
this healthy trend in all the policies. (Civil Society/Chile)
This influence arguably resulted in the policy not meeting the recommended 20% increase. 
Ideational considerations refer to how the policy problem is understood and conceptualized. This 
includes beliefs and biases about the issue and the proposed solution, and about the role of the 
state to address the problem at hand.  In the case countries, SSB consumption was understood in 
a similar way as vice-inducing products (i.e. tobacco and alcohol), and the SSB tax was part of 
what are called “sin taxes”, or economic measures to fix the negative externalities of the 
consumption from a given product, such as the public health cost. An ideational consideration 
behind SSB taxes was the belief that a monetary disincentive to the consumption of SSBs was a 
reasonable option. Whether this was the case was contested among key informants. Those 
against the tax did so arguing the multi-causal nature of obesity and diet-related conditions, 
going beyond a single product. Even those who favored the tax understood the policy as only one 
tool in a comprehensive public health approach, that included other policies, such as regulations 
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in food marketing, food labeling, and taxes on other products, such as the 8% tax on junk food 
implemented in Mexico (Chilikova 2016, Donaldson nd). 
Ideas and beliefs are influenced through diffusion mechanisms, including how much 
policymakers are exposed to international actors, and how much governments seek to emulate 
policies from highly regarded countries. Influence may stem from international organizations and 
donors, who might seek to promote certain policies or facilitate diffusion of lessons learned from 
other countries’ experiences (Resnick, Babu et al. 2015). We would expect the United States to 
be a major external influence on the diffusion of policies in our case countries. Mexico and Chile 
have significant historic economic links to the United States, and the United States has had a 
major influence on both countries’ economic development policies. We find some US influence 
in the SSB tax policy in key informants’ mentions of collaborations with US-based researchers 
(particularly, Dr. Barry Popkin from the University of North Carolina), and the role of the US-
based Bloomberg Philanthropies in Mexico, as addressed above. None of the actors mentioned 
US foreign policy as an important factor in deliberations, nor were international trade institutions 
such as the WTO perceived as relevant actors in the national tax discussion.   
In regards to cost-benefit analysis, research shows that SSB taxes provide substantial healthcare 
savings while providing additional revenue for governments, making this policy an attractive one 
based on the cost-benefit analysis (Brownell, Farley et al. 2009, Sanchez-Romero, Penko et al. 
2016, Wilde, Huang et al. 2019). Moreover, the cost-to-benefit ratios tend to be more favorable 
for low-income populations because they suffer from greater adverse effects from consumption 
and their consumption is more elastic to price changes (Lal, Mantilla-Herrera et al. 2017). Yet, 
there are potential nonmonetary costs associated with the policy that may influence its design, 
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for example losing electoral votes. How the public perceives the tax may later influence political 
outcomes for the party proposing the tax. As noted by one key informant, 
Taxes are always unpopular. When a government announces that they will raise a tax, it 
is a weapon that will be used against said government when the next elections come. 
(Researcher/Mexico)
Another “cost” considered in the design stage was the industry backlash, including the veto from 
politicians associated with the industry, if no concessions were made for these actors. As noted 
above, the industry has a strong policy influence in both countries. The two-tier tax system in 
Chile can be seen as the result of the industry’s influence and the policymaker cost-benefit 
calculation. With this design, the industry suffered an increase in the tax burden for high sugar 
products but received also an effective subsidy due to a tax cut for low sugary products (reduced 
from a 13% to a 10% tax rate). In a market where producers sell low and high sugary products, 
this allows the industry to compensate for the potential loss of revenues from an increased tax 
burden on certain products while receiving a tax reduction in others. 
Adoption 
Following the Kaleidoscope Model, the adoption of SSB taxes in Mexico and Chile was 
influenced by veto players, power dynamics and timing. In both settings, the SSB tax policy was 
introduced propitiously, as part of large fiscal reforms. In Mexico, efforts for the tax had been 
brewing since the late 2000s, when civil society organizations first introduced the measure into 
the 2006-2009 legislature, but the measure did not advance (Donaldson nd). The 2014 SSB tax in 
Mexico most likely was helped by this past failure experience, but also by the propitious 
introduction in the tax reform, and President’s Peña Nieto´s National Development Plan, which 
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included obesity as a national public health problem and made a National Strategy against 
Overweight, Obesity and Diabetes justifying several measures including fiscal reforms.
Power dynamics and veto players were also influential. Power dynamics can enable or create 
resistance to policy change. This variable was particularly salient concerning the contentious role 
of the food and beverage industry.  While public health advocates point to the profit orientation 
of the food and beverage industry as a reason why they should not be involved in the 
policymaking process of a regulatory policy that could affect their stakeholder interests, 
industry-affiliated key informants argued that the industry had a role to play. In both settings, the 
industry carried out a failed legal challenge to tax constitutionality, while also appealing to 
public, by placing themselves as defenders of customer freedom – both well-documented 
industry tactics (Nestle 2015, Cuadrado, Valenzuela et al. 2018). 
Veto players are the individuals that have to agree for the policy change to happen. In our cases 
these included the major ministries (e.g., Ministry of Finance), the parliament, and the president. 
The Mexican and Chilean policy changes were supported by the executive branch. Differences 
emerged concerning the role of the Ministry of Health. In Chile, the tax was seen as a relatively 
small change (5 percentage point increase), within a large policy reform that included a 
multitude of other initiatives. The Chilean Ministry of Health served mostly a technical advisor 
supporting the tax, as advocacy efforts of the ministry were being focused on the passing of food 
labeling and package regulation, being discussed in the same period (Chilikova 2016). In 
Mexico, the Ministry of Health was not supportive of the tax, a factor related to former industry 
ties. In Chile, the Ministry of Economics sided with industry, persuaded by concerns over 
potential deleterious effects over the employment and the economy. However, the measure was 
supported by the Ministry of Finance, a more influential part of the government, given the 
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revenue potential of the tax. Hence, the tax was promoted not so much for the potential health 
outcome, but for the fiscal revenue potential (Cuadrado, Valenzuela et al. 2018).
Implementation
Policy implementation is the most visible evidence of actual policy change. The Kaleidoscope 
Model examines this stage through three variables: institutional capacity (technical and 
administrative), requisite budgetary allocations and the policy champion commitment. 
Institutional capacity refers to both technical and administrative factors to implement the policy. 
Mexico and Chile have previous experiences with tax policies, demonstrating the existence of 
these capacities, and continuity, even after governmental turnover. Mexico’s volume-based 
design for the tax is easier to implement and monitor, compared to the Chilean tax design. The 
successful implementation of Chile’s new two-tiered system is dependent on the capacity to 
monitor how the industry reports sugar level volumes in their products – this could become 
highly complex even for well-established tax revenue agencies (Cuadrado, Valenzuela et al. 
2018). 
Budget allocations were not addressed by our key informants. Available evidence shows that the 
implementation costs of taxes are marginal. The administrative cost of the Chilean tax system is 
equivalent to 0.7% of the collected revenue and 0.79% in Mexico (2005-2013) (OECD 2015). 
Moreover, several economic evaluations conclude that SSB taxes are a cost-saving intervention 
(Cecchini, Sassi et al. 2010, Gortmaker, Long et al. 2015, Lal, Mantilla-Herrera et al. 2017).  
Having policy champions during implementation is important to help ensure that capacity and 
resources are available for the policy to be implemented as intended. The commitment of 
Mexico’s and Chile’s executive branches allowed the policy to be adopted and implemented, 
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despite the strong pushback from the food and beverage industry, particularly in Mexico. This 
commitment can be explained by the inclusion of the SSB taxes as part of larger fiscal reforms, 
which were high priorities on the governing agendas. 
In Mexico, the SSB tax was adopted with the idea that the revenue would be used to fund 
nutrition programs and improve access to drinking water. However, as mentioned by key 
informants, this has not been the case. 
Mexico made promises that it's not meeting. In passing the soda taxes, it said that the 
revenues would go to clean water in schools, and would go to infrastructure for clean 
water in cities, and it's not done that. (Global/Researcher)
While policymakers were committed to implementing the SSB tax, there was no commitment for 
using the revenue to support the public health goal of the policy, such as improving access to 
drinking water, as the preferred substitute for SSBs. Similarly, in the case of Chile, while 
policymakers pushed for an SSB tax to increase revenue, it is not that clear that they were 
backing a tax to improve health, as signaled by them giving the industry an effective tax 
reduction to SSBs below the sugar threshold. 
Evaluation and Reform
The Kaleidoscope Model argues that the level of reform depends on changing beliefs of veto 
players and champions, potentially brought up by evaluation results or new technology (Resnick, 
Babu et al. 2015). The SSB tax policy in Mexico and Chile is still fairly recent but impact 
evaluation studies are demonstrating changes in SSB sales and consumption, as well as impacts 
on health outcomes, particularly obesity rate (Sanchez-Romero, Penko et al. 2016, Bascuñán and 
Cuadrado 2017, Colchero, Rivera-Dommarco et al. 2017, Caro, Corvalan et al. 2018, Nakamura, 
Page 14 of 50
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/hpi































































Mirelman et al. 2018). The National Institute of Public Health of Mexico (INSP) convened a 
group with international experts, the Evaluation Advisory Committee, funded by Bloomberg 
Philantropies, to help evaluate the policies, housed within the Global Food Research Program at 
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Key informants discussed emerging results from 
evaluations, mostly addressing the SSB tax potential effects on prices and consumption. When 
discussing the changes brought by the policy, they mostly agreed that the tax increased the price, 
as intended. This supports and reinforces the idea that policy implementation produced the 
expected price effects. However, while the tax has resulted in diminished SSB consumption, the 
decrease has been lower than expected.  One reason for the small decrease might be that the 
industry responded with more marketing and big campaigns like the highly successful “Share a 
Coke” campaign. Some key informants saw the small effect magnitude as a sign that the tax 
needed modifications – particularly a higher rate increase. Other potential modifications included 
taxing other harmful foods and beverages to make the tax more comprehensive. Mexico already 
has a tax on “junk foods”, and one Chilean respondent mentioned this as a possibility for Chile, 
as suggested by an expert committee (Agostini, Corvalán et al. 2018). The respondent also 
suggested going beyond specific food-focused taxes, to potentially basing taxes on the level of 
food processing, for example. Another modification, particularly discussed in Mexico, was the 
need to follow the promised earmarking of the tax to improve water access, as the use of the tax 
revenue could play a very important role in determining whether the tax improves health 
outcomes. 
Informants also addressed potential substitution effects, of consumers potentially choosing less 
expensive brands of SSBs, or choosing beverages with artificial sweeteners, in response to the 
tax. 
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It's not really clear that if you substitute a normal Coke for a diet Coke that it's something 
good for you, [but] your ideal substitution will be Coke to water, and that's something 
that is not clearly happening because the policy is not aiming to do that. 
(Researcher/Chile)
In Chile, there was a fear that the two-tiered tax structure would lead to consumers opting for the 
lower sugar (not sugar-free, as the case of plain water) alternative, as the tax rate is lower. This 
points to a potential modification, where taxes can affect all sweetened beverages, as the recent 
tax in the Philippines, which includes beverages with artificial/noncaloric sweeteners (Onagan, 
Lorraine et al. 2019). 
Key informants associated with the industry noted the adverse economic consequences stemming 
from the reduction in SSB sales. However, this change was not attributed to the tax, and, instead 
was linked to the negative media discourse surrounding SSBs. These respondents noted the 
ripple effects of the slow-down in sales, particularly the closing of small businesses and the 
decrease in employment in related sectors. However, arguments concerning the adverse 
economic consequences of the tax have been commonly used by the industry, as part of the anti-
regulation playbook (Nestle 2015). In Mexico and Chile, researchers have evaluated the potential 
adverse effect on unemployment, finding no effect from the tax (Guerrero-López, Molina et al. 
2017). 
Key informants also addressed the regressive nature of the SSB tax, as a tax that 
disproportionately affects the poor. One industry informant noted that as consumers continue to 
buy SSBs, despite the higher price, the consumption of other household necessities is affected. In 
these remarks, SSBs were discussed as part of a basket of basic goods, as “the most basic 
products a Mexican consumer needs to survive.” (Industry/Mexico). On the other hand, while the 
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tax may disproportionately affect the poor, so do the health consequences of high SSB 
consumption, as explained by a researcher discussing the Mexican context: 
The decrease in sales and purchases of sugar-sweetened beverages was greater among the 
poverty-stricken people, which is good and expectable because they have fewer 
resources. […] If there's some effect on health, this could benefit them because, since 
there's no universal [health] coverage in Mexico, the poorest people could reduce their 
personal expenses. (Researcher/Mexico)
When asked about the future of the SSB policy, all of the informants conveyed the idea that the 
tax was here to stay, as an acceptable policy that provides government revenue. 
Discussion 
Our results point to the importance of top-down and bottom-up pressures for the adoption of the 
reform. In both countries, SSB taxes were the result of fiscal reforms promoted at the executive 
levels. The SSB taxes were facilitated by the following: high institutional feasibility, the 
leadership of key, high-level, individuals (i.e., the executiv  office in both countries), and 
coalitions/networks as drivers of policy adoption. Other key factors driving change were the 
narratives and framing used (as part of ideational considerations), and timing (seizing windows 
of opportunities). Concordant with other policy process analyses in nutrition, commitment for the 
SSB taxes in Chile and Mexico was also influenced by civil society mobilization (Baker, 
Hawkes et al. 2018). In Mexico, this was facilitated by donor involvement, not found in Chile. 
Chile is a smaller country, with existing connections between academic actors, civil society, and 
policymakers. 
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While SSB taxes are often touted as nutrition policy win, in Chile and Mexico, tax design was 
driven by revenue seeking goals, and not necessarily public health benefits. The need for revenue 
opened a window of opportunity, aligning interest from different institutions and actors (Thow, 
Quested et al. 2011). This revenue-generation framing may have also the ability of advocates to 
push back industry pressure to reduce and modify taxes, resulting, in both countries, in tax rates 
that were below the optimal rates for meeting public health goals. 
We used the Kaleidoscope Model for Policy Change as our study framework. This relatively new 
framework is worthy of consideration, given its special emphasis on food and nutrition policies. 
However, before this study, the Kaleidoscope Model has only been previously applied in low-
income settings (Resnick, Babu et al. 2015, Hendricks, Babu et al. 2017). When we applied it to 
SSB tax policy in high and upper-middle-income countries, we found that the model variables 
concurred with most factors that our key informants describe. Divergences from the model can 
be explained by the study time frame and the nature of SSB tax policy. We were not able to 
examine the variables in the Evaluation and Reform stage, due to the short timeframe of SSB tax 
adoption in our case study countries. We also found that the Kaleidoscope Model 
implementation cost variables may not be relevant for SSB tax policy reform given the relatively 
small cost of implementation and cost-saving nature of these taxes (Cecchini, Sassi et al. 2010, 
Gortmaker, Long et al. 2015, Lal, Mantilla-Herrera et al. 2017). Our study underscores 
differences between two key influential players: donors and the private sector. Donors are 
important in the Kaleidoscope Model. In Mexico, we found that the Bloomberg Philanthropies 
had a role in funding and creating networks that contributed to the success of the tax. However, 
the idea of the tax was in place prior to this funding. Bilateral and multilateral donors in other, 
more resource-limited settings may play a stronger advocacy role for food policy reform, but our 
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cases show that reform can occur in a high or upper-middle income setting without significant 
influence from these outside organizations. On the other hand, our analysis showed the influence 
of the food and beverage industry in shaping in the parameters of policy change, an influence not 
fully captured in the model, but shown to be crucial players both in our cases and in other cases 
of obesity-prevention policy-making (Baker, Hawkes et al. 2018). Future refinements of 
Kaleidoscope Model framework would need to further include the private sector as central 
players in food and nutrition policymaking. 
Our study collected the perspectives from civil society, academic, and industry respondents, as 
stakeholders influential in the policymaking process, and the inclusion of internal and global 
respondents. While we did not directly engage policymakers in our study, their perspectives have 
been documented in past research which we reviewed as part of this study (Chilikova 2016, 
Cuadrado, Valenzuela et al. 2018, Donaldson nd).  Our approach was further strengthened by the 
inclusion of Mexican and Chilean collaborators, who provided input throughout the process and 
allowed us to validate our findings. We were only able to include a small number of respondents 
representing the food and beverage industry in the study, as a hard-to-reach population in public 
health research. 
Conclusion
Our study compared the policy change process in two Latin American countries who were early 
adopters of SSB taxes with a public health goal, at the national level. SSB taxes are increasingly 
been used to address global concerns over diet-related chronic diseases, as part of larger nutrition 
and food policy toolbox to address diet-related diseases, a complex, multi-causal public health 
problem. These policies are complex and politically charged, given competing interests. This 
study was the first to address these policies using the Kaleidoscope Model, a new framework 
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designed specifically to address the complexity in nutrition and food policies. More research is 
needed to refine and adapt the Kaleidoscope Model, examining food policies to combat and 
prevent diet-related chronic diseases. Future studies can address other contested regulatory 
policies, such as front-of-package labeling and food marketing regulations. 
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Understanding Policy Change for Obesity Prevention: Learning from Sugar-
Sweetened Beverages Taxes in Mexico and Chile
Abstract 
This article examines the policy change process that resulted in the current sugar-sweetened 
beverages (SSB) taxes in Mexico and Chile, using the Kaleidoscope Model for Policy Change, a 
framework developed for nutrition and food policy change analysis. We used a qualitative study 
design, including 24 key informant interviews (16 researchers, 5 civil society representatives, 
and 3 food/beverage industry representatives), encompassing global and in-country perspectives. 
The analysis shows concurrence with the Kaleidoscope Model, highlighting commonalities in the 
policy change process. These included the importance of focusing events and coalitions for 
agenda-setting. Both top-down executive leadership and bottom-up pressure from civil society 
coalitions were important for the policy adoption as were flexible framing of the tax, and taking 
advantage of windows of opportunity. In both countries, the tax resulted from national, revenue-
seeking fiscal reforms, and in sub-optimal tax rates, as a result of the industry influence. Key 
informants also discussed emerging evaluation results, highlighting differences in interpretation 
concerning the magnitude of change from the tax, and shared potential modifications to the 
current policies. This analysis contributes to a greater understanding of the policy change process 
focused on obesity prevention, using an innovative theoretical framework developed specifically 
for food and nutrition policy. 
Keywords: Obesity prevention, Tax, Sugar-sweetened beverages, Policy process, Mexico, Chile, 
Qualitative research
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Policymakers and health advocates recognize the need to regulate food environments to 
positively influence eating behaviors in response to the rapid global rise in diet-related chronic 
diseases. A rising number of countries and jurisdictions have adopted policies regulating the 
consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) through taxes (Leonhardt 2018). Nutrition 
policymaking in general, and SSB tax policy in particular,  are highly contentious (Baker, 
Hawkes et al. 2018, Sassi, Belloni et al. 2018). Food evokes emotional, behavioral, and 
physiological responses among consumers, making policies aimed at restricting access to certain 
foods particularly contentious – as in the case of regulating sugary beverages. These policies 
inevitably trigger debates about the proper role of government in regulating harmful behavior 
(Sassi, Belloni et al. 2018), the role of the food and beverage industry, and conflict of interest in 
the food and nutrition policymaking process (Timotijevic, Barnett et al. 2011, Nestle 2013, 
Cuadrado, Valenzuela et al. 2018). 
The complex and contentious nature of regulatory and fiscal food and nutrition policies 
necessitates a better understanding of the policymaking process. Yet, research is limited in 
relation to obesity prevention policy change processes. Most studies have taken place in the 
United States and the United Kingdom, focusing on the agenda-setting stage of the policy 
process (Clarke, Swinburn et al. 2016).  Hence, the present study sought to address the existing 
research sparsity. We used SSB taxes in two Latin American countries (Mexico and Chile) as 
objects of comparative study to examine what explains successful SSB tax reform, using the 
Kaleidoscope Model for Policy Change framework developed specifically for food and nutrition 
policies.  
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Mexico and Chile were selected as they were as early adopters of SSB tax policy for public 
health purposes, at the national level, in Latin America. Mexico and Chile have similar political 
systems, as electoral democracies that have presidential systems with bicameral legislators. They 
also have similar economic systems, as market-oriented economies (CIA 2019, CIA 2019). Both 
have employed fiscal policies to address public health concerns over obesity and non-
communicable chronic diseases. Chile has been taxing nonalcoholic drinks as a luxury good 
since the 1930s to address the country’s fiscal deficit (Ferrando 2014). The tax was applied to all 
soft drinks with added color, flavor or sweeteners, regardless of the amount of sugar. In October 
2014, the tax was modified into a two-tiered tax, based on sugar content. It was increased from 
13% to 18% on drinks containing more than 6.25g of sugar/100 ml, and decreased to 10% for 
sugary drinks with less than 6.25g of sugar/100mL. Mexico implemented a new SSB tax in 2014, 
consisting of a 1-peso-per-liter excise tax on any non-alcoholic beverage with added sugar 
(approximately a 10% price increase), with the exception of dairy products. The rate was 
adjusted for inflation in 2018, increasing to 1.17 peso-per-liter (Colchero, Barrientos Gutiérrez et 
al. 2018). The SSB tax was accompanied by an 8% tax to foods with high caloric density (>275 
calories/100g), and an earlier tax on energy drinks of 25% implemented in 2011. The two cases 
have been examined individually, using mostly quantitative, impact evaluation studies 
(Colchero, Popkin et al. 2016, Sanchez-Romero, Penko et al. 2016, Caro, Corvalan et al. 2018, 
Nakamura, Mirelman et al. 2018), with a notable exception (James, Lajous et al. 2019). This 
qualitative examination provides a new, comparative approach. 
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The study was conducted between March and August 2018, using key informant (KI) interviews 
(n=24), and a comparative, retrospective approach (Charmaz 2006) to examine the policy change 
process resulting in the current SSB taxes in Mexico and Chile. We focused on non-government 
stakeholder perspectives, including global experts. Specifically, we interviewed 16 researchers (5 
from Mexico, 5 from Chile, and 6 Global), three food and beverage industry representatives (1 
from Mexico, 2 Global), and five civil society representatives (3 from Mexico, 2 from Chile). 
Respondents were purposively sampled based on their participation in the policymaking process 
and expertise on the field. We developed separate semi-structured interview guides for the 
different respondent types (researcher, civil society, and industry), based on relevant literature 
and feedback from Chilean and Mexican researchers. Questions asked about the respondents’ 
and/or their organization’s role in SSB tax reforms; their collaboration with other organizations 
and the government; their opinion on the state of the evidence regarding sugar consumption, 
taxes and health outcomes; and their opinions on the future of SSB tax policy.  
The study was deemed as exempt by the [blind] Institutional Review Board.  Interviews were 
conducted over phone or videoconference, in Spanish or English based on the preference of the 
respondent, ranging from 30 minutes to an hour. Interviewers completed a debriefing form at the 
end of each interview to record emerging findings, which were used to assess the data saturation 
point when interviews failed to elicit new information concerning the policy change process 
(Charmaz 2006). All interviews were audio-recorded with oral consent. The interviews were 
transcribed verbatim, translated, and checked for accuracy. 
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Data Analysis and Framework
The research team reviewed the interviewers’ debriefing forms on an ongoing basis, discussing 
emerging themes, used to develop an initial list of codes. Upon reaching the saturation point, the 
team used Dedoose (v. 8.2.14) to refine and test the coding scheme, through multiple rounds of 
discussions. Once the team reached inter-rater reliability of 80%, each transcript was analyzed by 
two independent coders. We then extracted key themes and quotes, organized using the 
Kaleidoscope Model for Policy Change as a framework. The Kaleidoscope Model is a relatively 
new framework developed by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) that 
synthesizes theories and constructs from the fields of political economy, public administration, 
and policy processes, to explain policy change in food and nutrition policy (Resnick, Babu et al. 
2015, Hendricks, Babu et al. 2017), going beyond political science approaches (as the case of the 
more widely used model, the Multiple Streams Theory), to include a wider range of scholarships, 
appropriate to engage the complexity in obesity prevention policy. The model focuses on five 
key elements in the policy cycle: agenda-setting, design, adoption, implementation, and 
evaluation and reform, identifying key variables that explain policy change (further detailed in 
Table 1). The model has been tested in mostly developing country settings, examining 
agriculture and micronutrient supplementation policies (Resnick, Babu et al. 2015, Hendriks, 
Mkwandawire et al. 2016, Hendricks, Babu et al. 2017, Resnick, Haggblade et al. 2018). The 
model was selected due to its explicit focus on food policy, capturing the multisectoral 
complexity affecting nutrition policymaking, where the policies often benefit poor, 
disenfranchised sectors in the country, with benefits often perceivable in the medium and long 
term (Resnick, Babu et al. 2015).
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The interview data were complemented with relevant literature and reports concerning the SSB 
taxes in both countries. As a final step in the process, we invited Mexican and Chilean experts to 
validate and contribute to the interpretation of the findings. 
Findings 
The Mexican and Chilean SSB tax policy processes were similar and largely in concordance with 
the Kaleidoscope Model (Table 1), except for the evaluation and reform stage. Next, we examine 
the processes in parallel, organized according to policy change stages. 
[insert- Table 1. Chile and Mexico SSB tax policy change overview organized through the 
Kaleidoscope Model Stages and Determinants]
Agenda-Setting
The Kaleidoscope Model underscores three main variables affecting the agenda-setting stage: the 
existence of a “focusing event” (events that create windows of opportunity), the influence of an 
advocacy coalition, and whether the problem is perceived as relevant. These are found in the 
Mexican and Chilean SSB tax policy processes. In both countries, propitious windows of 
opportunity, brought on by newly elected governments, gave way to SSB taxes as part of large, 
fiscal reforms. In Mexico, 2012 elected Peña Nieto administration implemented a major fiscal 
reform, the “Pact for Mexico”, to generate needed revenue in light of declining oil prices (James, 
Lajous et al. 2019). In Chile, the policy change was part of the largest fiscal reform in thirty 
years, which aimed to generate revenue for comprehensive educational reform (Cuadrado, 
Valenzuela et al. 2018), proposed by the Treasury and the Ministry of Finance. As such, these 
taxes had powerful advocates from the start. 
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Researchers in Mexico and Chile heightened the problem relevance by documenting the rise of 
obesity and chronic diseases, for several years prior to reform, recording the rise in obesity, diet-
related conditions, and SSB consumption. This is important, as nutrition issues, such as 
malnutrition and increasingly issues of over-nutrition, tend to affect marginalized segments of 
society (Pena and Bacallao 2000). These problems may remain invisible or ignored. Efforts were 
aided by civil society organizations, who served as intermediaries between researchers and 
policymakers, working as “knowledge brokers” for evidence backing SSB taxes and raising the 
problem relevance in the public sphere.  These organizations made strategic use of the media to 
control the debate over the taxes and to counter opponents’ arguments. Examples of these 
campaigns included a “Twitterazo” (tweeter storm) organized by Frente por un Chile Saludable 
resulting in 6,900 tweets and 13 million impressions advocating for the tax reform (NCDAlliance 
2015). In Mexico, El Poder del Consumidor organized public demonstrations, such one during 
the Day of the Dead dedicated to Mexicans who had died from Diabetes in front of the Ministry 
of Health (Donaldson nd).
Civil society organizations used the focusing event to argue for a 20% tax rate increase, as 
recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO 2016). These coalitions were composed 
of similar players in both cases: civil society organizations (e.g., El Poder del Consumidor in 
Mexico and Frente por un Chile Saludable), public health researchers, and government officials 
and global health institutions (e.g., World Health Organization/PAHO). El Poder del 
Consumidor pre-dated the SSB tax efforts, while Frente por un Chile Saludable was created 
during the tax reform, from existing networks with previous advocacy experience.  
Local advocacy coalitions interacted with US-based researchers who were well-known experts in 
the field and junior researchers, who contributed to the evidence-building and evaluation efforts. 
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In Mexico, the advocacy coalition building was facilitated through funding from the Bloomberg 
Philanthropies, supporting the collaboration between researchers, civil society, and lobbyists. 
While advocates shared the goal of addressing obesity, this international actor motivated the 
interactions between key players in the coalition, by liaising initial connections, and funding 
liaison positions, including a public-interest lobbying firm key in persuading legislators. 
Bloomberg Philanthropies were not mentioned as a funder in regards to the SSB tax in Chile. 
When discussing the policy arena in Chile, respondents noted the networks are relatively small, 
as researchers and policymakers were already connected. 
Policy Design
In Mexico, the tax is approximately 10%, while in Chile, the policy change resulted in a two-
tiered tax, where the rate for SSBs with high sugar content (>6.25 grams per 100 ml) increased 
by only 5 percentage points (from 13% to 18%) while the tax for SSBs with lower sugar content 
(<6.25 grams per 100 ml ) was decreased to 10%. Although the 18% rate in Chile is close to the 
WHO recommended 20% rate, advocates in Chile had wanted a 20 point increase, or a 33% tax 
rate, as they believed that this increase was necessary for the population to change consumption 
(Chilikova 2016). The resulting SSB tax policy design can be explained by the Kaleidoscope 
Model, as influenced by three main variables: the type of problem (pressing vs. chosen), 
ideational considerations, and a cost-benefit analysis. 
The type of problem influences policy design as it dictates the time policymakers can take to 
address it. SSB taxes are designed and implemented to address the problem of high SSB 
consumption, and related health consequences. This is a chosen problem, as opposed to crises or 
pressing problems (i.e. natural disasters, famines). Chosen problems are not urgent. 
Policymakers can take more time to design solutions, compared to crises. There is a greater 
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opportunity for outsider input and influence, opening the door for consultations with researchers, 
civil society and other stakeholders, such as the food and beverage industry, a powerful player in 
the policy arena in Latin America. 
[The] industry continues to be part of circles of power and decision-making, which 
sometimes limits power [of the government], not only designing and promoting public 
policy that affects their interests but also monitoring and the evaluation of it. (Civil 
Society/Mexico)
Industry pressure is very strong and has been enduring, even though Chile has adhered to 
this healthy trend in all the policies. (Civil Society/Chile)
This influence arguably resulted in the policy not meeting the recommended 20% increase. 
Ideational considerations refer to how the policy problem is understood and conceptualized. This 
includes beliefs and biases about the issue and the proposed solution, and about the role of the 
state to address the problem at hand.  In the case countries, SSB consumption was understood in 
a similar way as vice-inducing products (i.e. tobacco and alcohol), and the SSB tax was part of 
what are called “sin taxes”, or economic measures to fix the negative externalities of the 
consumption from a given product, such as the public health cost. An ideational consideration 
behind SSB taxes was the belief that a monetary disincentive to the consumption of SSBs was a 
reasonable option. Whether this was the case was contested among key informants. Those 
against the tax did so arguing the multi-causal nature of obesity and diet-related conditions, 
going beyond a single product. Even those who favored the tax understood the policy as only one 
tool in a comprehensive public health approach, that included other policies, such as regulations 
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in food marketing, food labeling, and taxes on other products, such as the 8% tax on junk food 
implemented in Mexico (Chilikova 2016, Donaldson nd). 
Ideas and beliefs are influenced through diffusion mechanisms, including how much 
policymakers are exposed to international actors, and how much governments seek to emulate 
policies from highly regarded countries. Influence may stem from international organizations and 
donors, who might seek to promote certain policies or facilitate diffusion of lessons learned from 
other countries’ experiences (Resnick, Babu et al. 2015). We would expect the United States to 
be a major external influence on the diffusion of policies in our case countries. Mexico and Chile 
have significant historic economic links to the United States, and the United States has had a 
major influence on both countries’ economic development policies. We find some US influence 
in the SSB tax policy in key informants’ mentions of collaborations with US-based researchers 
(particularly, Dr. Barry Popkin from the University of North Carolina), and the role of the US-
based Bloomberg Philanthropies in Mexico, as addressed above. None of the actors mentioned 
US foreign policy as an important factor in deliberations, nor were international trade institutions 
such as the WTO perceived as relevant actors in the national tax discussion.   
In regards to cost-benefit analysis, research shows that SSB taxes provide substantial healthcare 
savings while providing additional revenue for governments, making this policy an attractive one 
based on the cost-benefit analysis (Brownell, Farley et al. 2009, Sanchez-Romero, Penko et al. 
2016, Wilde, Huang et al. 2019). Moreover, the cost-to-benefit ratios tend to be more favorable 
for low-income populations because they suffer from greater adverse effects from consumption 
and their consumption is more elastic to price changes (Lal, Mantilla-Herrera et al. 2017). Yet, 
there are potential nonmonetary costs associated with the policy that may influence its design, 
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for example losing electoral votes. How the public perceives the tax may later influence political 
outcomes for the party proposing the tax. As noted by one key informant, 
Taxes are always unpopular. When a government announces that they will raise a tax, it 
is a weapon that will be used against said government when the next elections come. 
(Researcher/Mexico)
Another “cost” considered in the design stage was the industry backlash, including the veto from 
politicians associated with the industry, if no concessions were made for these actors. As noted 
above, the industry has a strong policy influence in both countries. The two-tier tax system in 
Chile can be seen as the result of the industry’s influence and the policymaker cost-benefit 
calculation. With this design, the industry suffered an increase in the tax burden for high sugar 
products but received also an effective subsidy due to a tax cut for low sugary products (reduced 
from a 13% to a 10% tax rate). In a market where producers sell low and high sugary products, 
this allows the industry to compensate for the potential loss of revenues from an increased tax 
burden on certain products while receiving a tax reduction in others. 
Adoption 
Following the Kaleidoscope Model, the adoption of SSB taxes in Mexico and Chile was 
influenced by veto players, power dynamics and timing. In both settings, the SSB tax policy was 
introduced propitiously, as part of large fiscal reforms. In Mexico, efforts for the tax had been 
brewing since the late 2000s, when civil society organizations first introduced the measure into 
the 2006-2009 legislature, but the measure did not advance (Donaldson nd). The 2014 SSB tax in 
Mexico most likely was helped by this past failure experience, but also by the propitious 
introduction in the tax reform, and President’s Peña Nieto´s National Development Plan, which 
Page 35 of 50
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/hpi































































included obesity as a national public health problem and made a National Strategy against 
Overweight, Obesity and Diabetes justifying several measures including fiscal reforms.
Power dynamics and veto players were also influential. Power dynamics can enable or create 
resistance to policy change. This variable was particularly salient concerning the contentious role 
of the food and beverage industry.  While public health advocates point to the profit orientation 
of the food and beverage industry as a reason why they should not be involved in the 
policymaking process of a regulatory policy that could affect their stakeholder interests, 
industry-affiliated key informants argued that the industry had a role to play. In both settings, the 
industry carried out a failed legal challenge to tax constitutionality, while also appealing to 
public, by placing themselves as defenders of customer freedom – both well-documented 
industry tactics (Nestle 2015, Cuadrado, Valenzuela et al. 2018). 
Veto players are the individuals that have to agree for the policy change to happen. In our cases 
these included the major ministries (e.g., Ministry of Finance), the parliament, and the president. 
The Mexican and Chilean policy changes were supported by the executive branch. Differences 
emerged concerning the role of the Ministry of Health. In Chile, the tax was seen as a relatively 
small change (5 percentage point increase), within a large policy reform that included a 
multitude of other initiatives. The Chilean Ministry of Health served mostly a technical advisor 
supporting the tax, as advocacy efforts of the ministry were being focused on the passing of food 
labeling and package regulation, being discussed in the same period (Chilikova 2016). In 
Mexico, the Ministry of Health was not supportive of the tax, a factor related to former industry 
ties. In Chile, the Ministry of Economics sided with industry, persuaded by concerns over 
potential deleterious effects over the employment and the economy. However, the measure was 
supported by the Ministry of Finance, a more influential part of the government, given the 
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revenue potential of the tax. Hence, the tax was promoted not so much for the potential health 
outcome, but for the fiscal revenue potential (Cuadrado, Valenzuela et al. 2018).
Implementation
Policy implementation is the most visible evidence of actual policy change. The Kaleidoscope 
Model examines this stage through three variables: institutional capacity (technical and 
administrative), requisite budgetary allocations and the policy champion commitment. 
Institutional capacity refers to both technical and administrative factors to implement the policy. 
Mexico and Chile have previous experiences with tax policies, demonstrating the existence of 
these capacities, and continuity, even after governmental turnover. Mexico’s volume-based 
design for the tax is easier to implement and monitor, compared to the Chilean tax design. The 
successful implementation of Chile’s new two-tiered system is dependent on the capacity to 
monitor how the industry reports sugar level volumes in their products – this could become 
highly complex even for well-established tax revenue agencies (Cuadrado, Valenzuela et al. 
2018). 
Budget allocations were not addressed by our key informants. Available evidence shows that the 
implementation costs of taxes are marginal. The administrative cost of the Chilean tax system is 
equivalent to 0.7% of the collected revenue and 0.79% in Mexico (2005-2013) (OECD 2015). 
Moreover, several economic evaluations conclude that SSB taxes are a cost-saving intervention 
(Cecchini, Sassi et al. 2010, Gortmaker, Long et al. 2015, Lal, Mantilla-Herrera et al. 2017).  
Having policy champions during implementation is important to help ensure that capacity and 
resources are available for the policy to be implemented as intended. The commitment of 
Mexico’s and Chile’s executive branches allowed the policy to be adopted and implemented, 
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despite the strong pushback from the food and beverage industry, particularly in Mexico. This 
commitment can be explained by the inclusion of the SSB taxes as part of larger fiscal reforms, 
which were high priorities on the governing agendas. 
In Mexico, the SSB tax was adopted with the idea that the revenue would be used to fund 
nutrition programs and improve access to drinking water. However, as mentioned by key 
informants, this has not been the case. 
Mexico made promises that it's not meeting. In passing the soda taxes, it said that the 
revenues would go to clean water in schools, and would go to infrastructure for clean 
water in cities, and it's not done that. (Global/Researcher)
While policymakers were committed to implementing the SSB tax, there was no commitment for 
using the revenue to support the public health goal of the policy, such as improving access to 
drinking water, as the preferred substitute for SSBs. Similarly, in the case of Chile, while 
policymakers pushed for an SSB tax to increase revenue, it is not that clear that they were 
backing a tax to improve health, as signaled by them giving the industry an effective tax 
reduction to SSBs below the sugar threshold. 
Evaluation and Reform
The Kaleidoscope Model argues that the level of reform depends on changing beliefs of veto 
players and champions, potentially brought up by evaluation results or new technology (Resnick, 
Babu et al. 2015). The SSB tax policy in Mexico and Chile is still fairly recent but impact 
evaluation studies are demonstrating changes in SSB sales and consumption, as well as impacts 
on health outcomes, particularly obesity rate (Sanchez-Romero, Penko et al. 2016, Bascuñán and 
Cuadrado 2017, Colchero, Rivera-Dommarco et al. 2017, Caro, Corvalan et al. 2018, Nakamura, 
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Mirelman et al. 2018). The National Institute of Public Health of Mexico (INSP) convened a 
group with international experts, the Evaluation Advisory Committee, funded by Bloomberg 
Philantropies, to help evaluate the policies, housed within the Global Food Research Program at 
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Key informants discussed emerging results from 
evaluations, mostly addressing the SSB tax potential effects on prices and consumption. When 
discussing the changes brought by the policy, they mostly agreed that the tax increased the price, 
as intended. This supports and reinforces the idea that policy implementation produced the 
expected price effects. However, while the tax has resulted in diminished SSB consumption, the 
decrease has been lower than expected.  One reason for the small decrease might be that the 
industry responded with more marketing and big campaigns like the highly successful “Share a 
Coke” campaign. Some key informants saw the small effect magnitude as a sign that the tax 
needed modifications – particularly a higher rate increase. Other potential modifications included 
taxing other harmful foods and beverages to make the tax more comprehensive. Mexico already 
has a tax on “junk foods”, and one Chilean respondent mentioned this as a possibility for Chile, 
as suggested by an expert committee (Agostini, Corvalán et al. 2018). The respondent also 
suggested going beyond specific food-focused taxes, to potentially basing taxes on the level of 
food processing, for example. Another modification, particularly discussed in Mexico, was the 
need to follow the promised earmarking of the tax to improve water access, as the use of the tax 
revenue could play a very important role in determining whether the tax improves health 
outcomes. 
Informants also addressed potential substitution effects, of consumers potentially choosing less 
expensive brands of SSBs, or choosing beverages with artificial sweeteners, in response to the 
tax. 
Page 39 of 50
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/hpi































































It's not really clear that if you substitute a normal Coke for a diet Coke that it's something 
good for you, [but] your ideal substitution will be Coke to water, and that's something 
that is not clearly happening because the policy is not aiming to do that. 
(Researcher/Chile)
In Chile, there was a fear that the two-tiered tax structure would lead to consumers opting for the 
lower sugar (not sugar-free, as the case of plain water) alternative, as the tax rate is lower. This 
points to a potential modification, where taxes can affect all sweetened beverages, as the recent 
tax in the Philippines, which includes beverages with artificial/noncaloric sweeteners (Onagan, 
Lorraine et al. 2019). 
Key informants associated with the industry noted the adverse economic consequences stemming 
from the reduction in SSB sales. However, this change was not attributed to the tax, and, instead 
was linked to the negative media discourse surrounding SSBs. These respondents noted the 
ripple effects of the slow-down in sales, particularly the closing of small businesses and the 
decrease in employment in related sectors. However, arguments concerning the adverse 
economic consequences of the tax have been commonly used by the industry, as part of the anti-
regulation playbook (Nestle 2015). In Mexico and Chile, researchers have evaluated the potential 
adverse effect on unemployment, finding no effect from the tax (Guerrero-López, Molina et al. 
2017). 
Key informants also addressed the regressive nature of the SSB tax, as a tax that 
disproportionately affects the poor. One industry informant noted that as consumers continue to 
buy SSBs, despite the higher price, the consumption of other household necessities is affected. In 
these remarks, SSBs were discussed as part of a basket of basic goods, as “the most basic 
products a Mexican consumer needs to survive.” (Industry/Mexico). On the other hand, while the 
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tax may disproportionately affect the poor, so do the health consequences of high SSB 
consumption, as explained by a researcher discussing the Mexican context: 
The decrease in sales and purchases of sugar-sweetened beverages was greater among the 
poverty-stricken people, which is good and expectable because they have fewer 
resources. […] If there's some effect on health, this could benefit them because, since 
there's no universal [health] coverage in Mexico, the poorest people could reduce their 
personal expenses. (Researcher/Mexico)
When asked about the future of the SSB policy, all of the informants conveyed the idea that the 
tax was here to stay, as an acceptable policy that provides government revenue. 
Discussion 
Our results point to the importance of top-down and bottom-up pressures for the adoption of the 
reform. In both countries, SSB taxes were the result of fiscal reforms promoted at the executive 
levels. The SSB taxes were facilitated by the following: high institutional feasibility, the 
leadership of key, high-level, individuals (i.e., the executiv  office in both countries), and 
coalitions/networks as drivers of policy adoption. Other key factors driving change were the 
narratives and framing used (as part of ideational considerations), and timing (seizing windows 
of opportunities). Concordant with other policy process analyses in nutrition, commitment for the 
SSB taxes in Chile and Mexico was also influenced by civil society mobilization (Baker, 
Hawkes et al. 2018). In Mexico, this was facilitated by donor involvement, not found in Chile. 
Chile is a smaller country, with existing connections between academic actors, civil society, and 
policymakers. 
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While SSB taxes are often touted as nutrition policy win, in Chile and Mexico, tax design was 
driven by revenue seeking goals, and not necessarily public health benefits. The need for revenue 
opened a window of opportunity, aligning interest from different institutions and actors (Thow, 
Quested et al. 2011). This revenue-generation framing may have also the ability of advocates to 
push back industry pressure to reduce and modify taxes, resulting, in both countries, in tax rates 
that were below the optimal rates for meeting public health goals. 
We used the Kaleidoscope Model for Policy Change as our study framework. This relatively new 
framework is worthy of consideration, given its special emphasis on food and nutrition policies. 
However, before this study, the Kaleidoscope Model has only been previously applied in low-
income settings (Resnick, Babu et al. 2015, Hendricks, Babu et al. 2017). When we applied it to 
SSB tax policy in high and upper-middle-income countries, we found that the model variables 
concurred with most factors that our key informants describe. Divergences from the model can 
be explained by the study time frame and the nature of SSB tax policy. We were not able to 
examine the variables in the Evaluation and Reform stage, due to the short timeframe of SSB tax 
adoption in our case study countries. We also found that the Kaleidoscope Model 
implementation cost variables may not be relevant for SSB tax policy reform given the relatively 
small cost of implementation and cost-saving nature of these taxes (Cecchini, Sassi et al. 2010, 
Gortmaker, Long et al. 2015, Lal, Mantilla-Herrera et al. 2017). Our study underscores 
differences between two key influential players: donors and the private sector. Donors are 
important in the Kaleidoscope Model. In Mexico, we found that the Bloomberg Philanthropies 
had a role in funding and creating networks that contributed to the success of the tax. However, 
the idea of the tax was in place prior to this funding. Bilateral and multilateral donors in other, 
more resource-limited settings may play a stronger advocacy role for food policy reform, but our 
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cases show that reform can occur in a high or upper-middle income setting without significant 
influence from these outside organizations. On the other hand, our analysis showed the influence 
of the food and beverage industry in shaping in the parameters of policy change, an influence not 
fully captured in the model, but shown to be crucial players both in our cases and in other cases 
of obesity-prevention policy-making (Baker, Hawkes et al. 2018). Future refinements of 
Kaleidoscope Model framework would need to further include the private sector as central 
players in food and nutrition policymaking. 
Our study collected the perspectives from civil society, academic, and industry respondents, as 
stakeholders influential in the policymaking process, and the inclusion of internal and global 
respondents. While we did not directly engage policymakers in our study, their perspectives have 
been documented in past research which we reviewed as part of this study (Chilikova 2016, 
Cuadrado, Valenzuela et al. 2018, Donaldson nd).  Our approach was further strengthened by the 
inclusion of Mexican and Chilean collaborators, who provided input throughout the process and 
allowed us to validate our findings. We were only able to include a small number of respondents 
representing the food and beverage industry in the study, as a hard-to-reach population in public 
health research. 
Conclusion
Our study compared the policy change process in two Latin American countries who were early 
adopters of SSB taxes with a public health goal, at the national level. SSB taxes are increasingly 
been used to address global concerns over diet-related chronic diseases, as part of larger nutrition 
and food policy toolbox to address diet-related diseases, a complex, multi-causal public health 
problem. These policies are complex and politically charged, given competing interests. This 
study was the first to address these policies using the Kaleidoscope Model, a new framework 
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designed specifically to address the complexity in nutrition and food policies. More research is 
needed to refine and adapt the Kaleidoscope Model, examining food policies to combat and 
prevent diet-related chronic diseases. Future studies can address other contested regulatory 
policies, such as front-of-package labeling and food marketing regulations. 
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Table 1. Chile and Mexico SSB tax policy change overview organized through the Kaleidoscope 
Model Stages and Determinants
Country comparison Policy Change 
Stage Determinant
Agenda Setting Focusing event In both settings, fiscal reform created a window of 
opportunity
Powerful advocates In both settings, the policy was supported by 
strong civil society coalitions and the executive 
branch. In Mexico, this was facilitated by 
international donors (Bloomberg Foundation).  
Recognized, relevant 
problems
In both settings, diet-related, chronic conditions 
and high SSB consumption recognized as relevant 
problems
Design Type of problem SSB consumption is a “chosen problem”, which, 
compared with pressing problems (i.e. 
emergencies), allow for a longer period of 
deliberation on the design stage
Ideational 
considerations
SSB consumption is conceptualized in a similar 
way as tobacco or alcohol, where the solution is a 
“sin tax”
Cost benefits / risk 
calculations
SSB taxes may have a political cost. Monetary 
costs are outweighed by the revenue and social 
benefit. 
Adoption Powerful proponents In both settings, there were powerful (albeit 
different) proponents. While the presidents and 
Ministries of Finance backed the policy, the main 
difference was in the Ministry of Health, which 
backed the policy in Chile, but not in Mexico. 
Government veto 
players
Different veto players at the executive level. In 
Mexico, the Ministry of Health was against the 
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policy, while the Ministry of Economics was 
against the policy in Chile. 
Propitious timing In both, the propitious timing was provided by the 
window of opportunity (the fiscal reform)
Implementation Requisite budget There were insufficient data to assess the 
budgetary implications of the policy, but the cost 
of implanting taxes is expectedly low or null, 
given the increase over government revenue
Institutional capacity Both settings have the institutional capacity to 
implement taxes, but different limitations were 
present for aspects of the policy. 
Commitment of policy 
champions
In both settings, the SSB taxes have the continued 
support of powerful advocates, but there are 
differences present in aspects of the policy, such as 





Not found in data, given the recent timeframe of 





Not applicable. Given the timing of interviews, 
changes stemming from presidential elections 
were not examinable. 
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